Kevin M. Presto

Vice President and head of Enron's East Power trading desk, managing one of the company's most successful regional power operations through the 2001 bankruptcy.

Kevin M. Presto

Kevin M. Presto served as Vice President and head of the East Power trading desk at Enron Power Marketing Inc. (EPMI) from late 2000 through the company’s bankruptcy in 2001-2002. Operating under the supervision of John J. Lavorato and Louise Kitchen, Presto managed one of Enron’s most successful regional power trading operations during the peak of the company’s wholesale energy business. By mid-2001, his desk had traded over 600 million megawatt-hours year-to-date, representing a 33 percent increase over the entire previous year’s volume, with positive profit and loss performance across all Eastern regions. Presto also oversaw the development of power generation facilities totaling approximately 3,000 megawatts of capacity.

Presto’s email archive in the Enron corpus contains 5,503 messages spanning November 28, 2000 to November 30, 2002, documenting his work across East Power trading operations, asset management, and the company’s final months through bankruptcy.

Career at Enron

Background

Before joining Enron, Kevin Presto held senior-level positions at Bear Stearns, UBS, and Enserch in energy trading and finance. His experience in power markets and generation development positioned him to lead one of Enron’s major regional trading desks. The exact date of his arrival at Enron is unclear, though his email archive begins in late November 2000, suggesting he assumed the East Power leadership role around that time.

Head of East Power Trading

Presto led the East Power trading desk within Enron Power Marketing Inc., overseeing power trading operations across Eastern United States markets. His desk was responsible for both speculative trading and structured arrangements with physical generation assets. The East Power operation coordinated with other EPMI desks including Tim Belden’s West Power desk, and reported through John J. Lavorato to the broader Trading Operations leadership.

As desk head, Presto had substantial trading authority. In June 2001, he and Rogers Herndon established approval thresholds where Presto could authorize deals up to 1 million MWh without escalation, with Lavorato required for deals up to 2 million MWh. This level of authority reflected the desk’s size and the trust placed in Presto’s judgment by senior management.

Presto’s regular schedule included weekly meetings with Lavorato, fundamentals meetings, traders roundtables with Jeff Shankman, and daily position reports. Calendar entries show recurring meetings including “Weekly Mtg. w/John Lavorato rm 3308” (139 occurrences) and “Traders Roundtable Mtg. w/Shankman rm 3321” (140 occurrences).

Trading Performance

Volume Growth and Financial Results

The East Power desk achieved exceptional performance in the first half of 2001. When Jeff Skilling requested highlights for a company floor meeting in June 2001, Presto prepared a summary demonstrating the desk’s success.

These figures reflected both the growth in power market liquidity and Enron’s dominant position facilitated by EnronOnline. The desk’s 350 trades per day average on the electronic platform represented a 250 percent increase from the previous year, while the expansion of active trading “through 2005 in nearly every eastern market” demonstrated improved forward curve liquidity.

EnronOnline Integration

The East Power desk heavily utilized EnronOnline for executing trades. The jump from 100 daily EOL transactions in 2000 to 350 in 2001, with peaks near 500, showed how the platform had transformed power trading efficiency. Louise Kitchen, who had created EnronOnline, distributed quarterly performance results to all desk heads including Presto, tracking soft targets that measured platform adoption alongside financial performance.

Cross-Desk Resource Sharing

Presto negotiated resource sharing arrangements with other desks. In February 2001, he documented an agreement with Christopher Calger regarding employee Scott Healy’s involvement in East Power projects.

This email illustrates the matrix of negotiations between desk heads over resources and P&L attribution that characterized Enron’s trading culture.

Asset Management and Origination

Power Plant Tolling Agreements

Beyond speculative trading, Presto managed complex structured arrangements with physical generation assets. The New Albany power plant tolling agreement, documented in December 2000, exemplifies these transactions.

The agreement covered a 360 MW facility with demand charges declining from $4.72/kW/month in 2001 to $4.36/kW/month in 2005, structured against a depreciated book value from $409/kW to $336/kW over the period. This type of tolling arrangement gave East Power optionality to convert natural gas into electricity at a fixed heat rate, enabling arbitrage opportunities between gas and power markets.

The New Albany facility was later sold to Duke Energy. In June 2001, Louise Kitchen sought Presto’s approval on Duke’s draft press release announcing the acquisition.

Development Projects

According to professional sources, Presto served as project manager “with direct responsibility for the fast track development and construction of 6 power generation facilities totaling 3,000 MW” while at Enron. This development role complemented the trading desk’s need for physical generation assets to support structured products and hedge trading positions.

In July 2001, Kitchen scheduled approval meetings with Presto and Lloyd Will for the Brooklyn Navy Yard project.

Relationship with Louise Kitchen

Louise Kitchen, as President of Enron Americas and Chief Operating Officer, maintained regular communication with Presto on strategic and operational matters. Their correspondence covered quarterly performance targets, asset sales, project approvals, and personnel decisions.

Kitchen’s April 30, 2001 distribution of “Results of Q1 soft targets” went to all desk heads including Presto, Tim Belden, and others, with John J. Lavorato copied. This peer grouping reflects Presto’s status alongside other major desk heads in the trading organization.

Personnel decisions required coordination with Kitchen. In August 2001, when Kim Melodick asked Presto about proceeding with Corry Bentley’s employment agreement, she noted it would go “to Robert Jones and Louise Kitchen” for final approval. In September 2001, Presto joined Kitchen and Lloyd Will to review the Services business.

Key Correspondents

Presto’s email patterns reveal his operational relationships across the East Power organization and broader trading operations.

Name Messages Position
Mark Dana Davis 238 East Power trader
Rika Imai 206 Support staff
Paul J. Broderick 191 Trading personnel
Rogers Herndon 186 East Power, real-time operations
Garrett Tripp 165 Trading personnel
Jason Kaniss 154 Trading personnel
Tim Belden 71 West Power desk head
Louise Kitchen 59 President, Enron Americas
Christopher F. Calger 58 West Power origination
Fletcher J. Sturm 58 East Power trader

Rogers Herndon emerges as a key operational partner, managing real-time trading operations and participating in authority discussions. The 71 messages with Tim Belden reflect coordination between the East and West power desks, though their operations covered different geographic markets and regulatory environments.

California Energy Crisis

During a journalist’s visit to Enron’s trading floor in February 2001, Presto demonstrated how Enron operated in California power markets. According to the San Francisco Chronicle, Presto “demonstrated how Enron was buying power in California at $250 per megawatt hour and selling it at $275.” While the East Power desk primarily focused on Eastern markets, this demonstration indicates Presto had visibility into California operations and participated in public relations activities showcasing Enron’s trading capabilities.

The West Power desk under Tim Belden faced criminal scrutiny for California trading practices, but no similar allegations emerged regarding East Power operations.

Email Activity

Presto’s monthly email volume reveals patterns aligned with organizational events and the company’s crisis.

Period Monthly Emails Context
November 2000 4 Archive begins
December 2000 54 Ramping up
January 2001 203 Normal operations
May 2001 1,770 PRC reviews, organizational changes
June 2001 321 Post-PRC normalization
October 2001 773 Financial crisis begins
November 2001 304 Bankruptcy filing period
January 2002 429 Post-bankruptcy operations
February 2002 211 Contract terminations

The May 2001 spike of 1,770 emails correlates with Performance Review Committee processes and organizational changes, when trading managers would be heavily involved in personnel evaluations and feedback. The October 2001 peak of 773 emails coincided with the onset of Enron’s financial crisis.

Enron’s Collapse

Early Warning Signs

As Enron’s financial situation deteriorated in October 2001, Presto demonstrated awareness of the fundamental issues. On October 22, 2001, he summarized the situation tersely in an email: “We have some serious issues. Downgrade, collateral called, liquidity crisis, issue more equity.”

That same day, Rogers Herndon shared his assessment with Presto: “yeah, don’t know if they will really want an ene rep on the panel. i really expected a fastow resignation - maybe tomorrow. looks to me like a merger is on the order.” These exchanges show the trading desk grappling with rapidly evolving corporate events and uncertainty about the company’s future.

Bankruptcy Operations

Following Enron’s bankruptcy filing in December 2001, Presto continued managing the wind-down of East Power operations. His archive contains termination notices and tracking documents as counterparties exercised rights to terminate contracts with EPMI.

By February 2002, Presto was receiving and distributing documents including the “EPMI Termination Log” and “Master Termination Log” from Stephanie Panus, tracking counterparties terminating contracts through early February. The “FW: EPMI List Non terminated parties” emails show ongoing monitoring of which trading relationships remained active.

Systems Challenges

Even before the bankruptcy, Presto dealt with integration challenges across Enron’s trading systems. In June 2001, he noted problems with the Enpower system handling retail deals from Enron Energy Services.

This pragmatic approach to system limitations reflected the desk’s focus on operational continuity.

No public records indicate that Kevin Presto faced criminal prosecution or civil enforcement action related to his work at Enron. Unlike Tim Belden, who headed West Power and pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges related to California energy market manipulation, Presto’s East Power operations did not generate comparable legal scrutiny. His absence from Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement actions suggests the East Power desk’s trading practices did not raise the same concerns as certain West Coast operations.

Presto’s subsequent career included positions at Bear Stearns and UBS, consistent with someone who remained in good standing within the energy trading and finance industry after Enron’s collapse.

See Also

  • Louise Kitchen - President of Enron Americas and COO who supervised trading operations
  • John J. Lavorato - Direct supervisor overseeing power trading desks
  • Trading Operations - Overview of Enron’s wholesale trading business
  • EnronOnline - Electronic trading platform used extensively by East Power desk
  • Tim Belden - West Power desk head, peer to Presto in trading organization

References

This article is based on 5,503 emails from Kevin Presto’s archive in the Enron email corpus, spanning November 28, 2000 to November 30, 2002. Email queries were executed against the DuckDB database containing the complete Enron PST archive.

Secondary sources include professional biographical information and contemporary press coverage from the San Francisco Chronicle regarding Enron’s trading floor operations during the California energy crisis.